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o n e
On the Human "Interaction Engine"
Stephen C. Levinson
My goal in this chapter is to make the case that the roots of human sociality lie in a special capacity for social interaction,1 which 
itself holds the key to human evolution, the evolution of language, 
the nature of much of our daily concerns, the building blocks of social 
systems, and even the limitations of our political systems.
Much of the speculation about the origins and success of our species 
centers on the source of our big brains, the structure of our cognition, 
on the origins of language, the innate structures that support it, and 
on the striking cooperative potential in the species. These are genuine 
and important puzzles, but in the rush to understand them, we seem 
to have overlooked a core human ability and propensity, the study of 
which would throw a great deal of light on these other issues. It is right 
under our noses, much more accessible than the recesses of our brains or 
the fossils that track our evolutionary origins, and quite understudied. 
It is the structure of everyday human interaction.
Despite the fact that it is over fifty years since human interaction was 
first treated as a scientific object of inquiry deserving of a natural history 
(Bateson 1955; Chappie and Arensberg 1940; see also Kendon 1990), 
progress has been quite limited. One problem has simply been that 
human interaction lies in an interdisciplinary no-man's land: it belongs 
equally to anthropology, sociology, biology, psychology, and ethology 
but is owned by none of them. Observations, generalizations and theory 
have therefore been pulled in different directions, and nothing close to 
a synthesis has emerged. In this chapter, I therefore try to stand back 
and extract some generalizations about the special human abilities that 
seem to lie behind the structure of social interaction.
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Are there Special Principles of Human Interaction?
Human interaction, by comparison with what goes on in even our 
nearest relatives, looks very distinctive, suggesting that there may be 
specific principles or abstract properties that underlie it. One starting 
point would be to ask whether there is a core universal set of proclivities 
and abilities that humans bring, by virtue of human nature, to the 
business of interaction—properties of interaction that are at source 
independent of variations in language and culture. Although much 
might be attributable to language, there are quite good prima facie 
grounds for thinking that human interactional abilities are at least 
partially independent of both language and culture:
■ Travelers to foreign lands report successful transactions conducted 
without language. Captain Cook's unintended sojourn in Cape 
York is a case in point, or Thomas Henry Huxley's journeys on 
HMS Rattlesnake. The best documentary evidence is probably the 
film First Contact (Connolly and Anderson 1987), incorporating 
footage made by the gold prospecting Leahy brothers contacting 
tribes in Highland New Guinea for the first time in the 1930s: it 
is as if the basis for transactional interactions exist independently 
of culture and language, and the slots can in necessity be filled 
by mime and iconic gesture (see Goodwin this volume).2 Quine's 
(1960) demonstration of the impediments to "radical translation" 
notwithstanding, something like it seems anyway to occur.
■ Infants show an early appreciation of the give and take of interaction 
(Bruner 1976) long before they speak, indeed arguably at four 
months (Rochat et al. 1999), only two months old (Trevarthen 
1979), or even 48 hours (Melzoff and Moore 1977), depending on 
the measure. By nine months old, infants are embarked on complex 
triadic interactions between ego, alter, and an object in attention 
(Striano and Tomasello 2001). We know that different cultures have 
different infant-caretaker patterns (see Gaskins this volume), so it 
is hard to rule out early cultural influence, but the infant evidence 
is highly suggestive of an ethological basis on which cultures may 
or may not choose to build in early infancy.
■ When language is lost, interaction doesn't disappear—restricted 
channels of communication, as in aphasia, can nevertheless support 
rich interaction (Goodwin 2003).
■ There is some evidence for a distinct "social intelligence" (Gardner 
1985; Goody 1995) from inherited deficits and neurological case
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studies. The study of autism and Asperger's syndrome, in comparison 
with, say Down's syndrome kids, suggest a double dissociation: high- 
reasoning abilities, low social skills (Asperger's), low-reasoning skills, 
high social skills (high-functioning Down's)—see Baron-Cohen 2000 
and Baron-Cohen et al. 1985. Similarly, different kinds of frontal 
lobe lesions induce different kinds of interactional incompetence, 
for example right temporal lesions correlate with flat affect and the 
loss of nonsuperficial understandings as required for jokes (Kolb 
and Whishaw 1990:607ff.; see Baron-Cohen 2000:1252 for brain- 
imaging evidence).
Languages can switch midstream in interaction ("code-switching"), 
leaving the interactional framework undisturbed, evidence that 
interaction structure is independent of the "coded" signal systems 
of language (Muysken 2000).
Ethnographic reports on interaction style rarely question the applic­
ability of the fundamentals. Where they do, as in Basso's (1970) 
account of massively delayed greetings in Apache, or Albert (1972) 
on turn taking according to rank in Burundi, or Reisman (1974) 
on "contrapuntal conversation" in the West Indies, there is reason 
to believe they are describing something other than the unmarked 
conversational norm (Sidnell 2001). What the ethnographic reports 
nevertheless do make a good case for is cultural shaping of all the 
modalities of interaction, from spacing, posture, and gesture to 
linguistic form.
The small amount of work that has been done on the structure 
of conversation cross-linguistically and cross-culturally (on Thai, 
Japanese, Korean, Mandarin, etc.) shows remarkable convergence in 
many details, supporting the idea of a shared universal framework 
for verbal interaction (see, e.g., Clancy et al. 1996; Hayashi 2003; 
Moerman 1989).
Humans look different from other primates in the amount of time 
and effort invested in interaction—it would be interesting to see 
them in a zoo. We don't actually have good measures of this. Dunbar 
(1997:116) reports a study of a New Guinea tribe (the Kapanora) 
whose males spend 30 percent (the women slightly less) of daylight 
time socializing (or gossiping),3 compared with 20 percent for gelada 
baboons (doing grooming), but my suspicion is that such figures 
hugely underestimate the amount of human social interaction 
during the business of the day, not to mention the entertainments 
of the night. Allowing for differences caused by population density, 
age and gender, and subsistence mode (fishermen may spend the
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day alone), and Hymes's (1972) notes about cultural differences in 
volubility/ my guess is that humans on average spend somewhere 
between 30 percent and 70 percent of waking hours in social 
interaction, whether at work or play.5
I hope this sort of rough and ready list is enough to give the proposal 
prima facie plausibility—the proposal that, from an ethological point of 
view, humans have a distinctive, pan-specific pattern of interaction with 
conspecifics, marked by (1) intensity and duration, (2) specific structural 
properties, and (3) those properties separable from the language with 
which it is normally conducted.
Scholars from some disciplines may be puzzled by the absence of 
language from this catalogue of evidence for a human interactional 
specialization. We are (along with the song birds) a distinctively chat­
tering species. The reason for the demotion of language is that so 
much attention has been given to it that we have been damagingly 
distracted from the interactional underpinnings that make it possible. 
Students of language usage have tried to remedy this, from Grice 1975 
to Sperber and Wilson 1995 to my own earlier self—it is quite clear to 
us that "Language didn't make interactional intelligence possible, it is 
interactional intelligence that made language possible as a means of 
communication" (Levinson 1995:232). So language is the explicandum, 
not the explicans—humans did not evolve language, then get involved 
in a special kind of social life, it was just the reverse. For language must 
have evolved for something for which there was already a need—that 
is, for communication in interaction.
Finally, there is another striking kind of evidence for the independence 
of interaction principles from the specifics of language and culture. 
Around the world, children are born deaf to hearing parents, who 
sometimes raise their children without access to a conventional sign 
language. What emerges is called "home sign," an expressive signing 
system invented by the child to make himself or herself understood, 
and that is reciprocated by other means (see Goldin-Meadow this 
volume). In societies without institutional education of the deaf or a 
sizeable deaf community, such "home-sign" systems can remain the 
only communication system for deaf adults. I have investigated a couple 
of such cases on Rossel Island, a remote island community in Papua New 
Guinea. Take the case of Kpemuwo, about twenty-eight years old, born 
in a village where he is the only deaf person, which is three hours walk 
away from any other deaf people. One day he came to me when I was 
alone and proceeded to sign. To my intense surprise, I thought I could
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understand quite a bit of what he was "saying" although we shared 
no language, little culture and just a bit of background knowledge. 
He seemed to be communicating, by means of pointings and iconic 
gestures, about a woman who was dying of cancer in the neighborhood: 
There was a lot of detail about the course of her disease, her futile trip 
to the mainland for treatment, the visits of her daughters, and so forth. 
Then, when my hosts returned, I got them to "translate" as best they 
could Kpemuwo's message—according to them, much of what I had 
inferred was correct. They obtained much further detailed explication, 
for example about the cause of the impeding death, caused by the 
antisorcery god Nkaa, depicted by mime as his eagle avatar (see Fig. 1.1), 
and hence Kpemuwo's reluctance to help the family of the convicted 
sorcerer.6
A moment's reflection will reveal the depth of the mystery here. How 
is it possible for two people who share no language and little cultural 
background (myself and Kpemuwo) to communicate at all? For Quine's 
"radical translation" to be possible after all, despite his scruples, there 
has to be some powerful meaning-making machinery that we all share. 
This depends, I claim, on a peculiar ability to match communicative 
intentions within an interactional framework. Kpemuwo and I got as far 
as we did because first he signed in such a way as to make his intentions 
maximally clear to me, and then I gestured my understanding of what
Figure 1.1. Kpemuwo, deaf home signer on Rossel Island, inventing a way to 
communicate about abstract ideas concerning sorcery.
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he signed, and then he in response attempted to correct or narrow 
my interpretation, until step by step we converged on an understand­
ing. Intention recognition and the mechanics of turn taking are 
deeply interlocked. The focus of this chapter is on what exactly 
Kpémuwô and I share that makes it possible for us to communicate, 
when we share so little other background in conventions of culture 
and communication.
The Idea of a Core "Interaction Engine":
W hat the Output Shows
The idea in a nutshell is that humans are natively endowed with a set 
of cognitive abilities and behavioral dispositions that synergistically 
work together to endow human face-to-face interaction with certain 
special qualities. I call these elements collectively the human interaction 
engine (which is meant to suggest both dedicated mental machinery and 
motive power, i.e., both "savvy'' and "oomph"). Right away, I should 
underline this is not a proposal for a "social cognition module," "a 
culture acquisition device/' "cognitive culture system" or an "interaction 
gene" or anything of that simple-minded sort (see, e.g., Jackendoff 
1992; Pinker 1997; Talmy 2000:373ff.). Those accounts assume that 
the kind of approach taken to the "language module" or "language 
instinct" can be copied across into a "social-cultural module," and I 
am arguing nothing of the kind. What I am entertaining is that there 
are underlying universal properties of human interaction that can be 
thought of as having a cognitive-and-ethological foundation. Evolution 
is ",bricolage" (to use Levi-Strauss's term), seizing what is at hand in the 
organism's phenotype to construct an often ramshackle but adaptive 
system. So an "interaction engine" could be constructed of scraps of 
motivational tendencies, temporal sensitivities (reaction contingencies), 
semicooperative instincts, ancient ethological facial displays, the capa­
city to analyze other's actions through mental simulation, and so forth. 
The model is a Jean Tinguely kinetic sculpture built of bric-a-brac, not 
a Fodorean mental module (Fodor 1983), let alone a Chomskyan point 
v mutation (Bickerton 1998; Hauser et al. 2002).
Whatever your doubts, just entertain the idea for a moment (I turn 
to the crucial question of cross-cultural variability in the next section). 
Before we ask "What exactly are the elements of the interaction engine?" 
we need to ask what it needs to account for, that is, what the crucial 
properties of human interaction are. From the output, we can guess
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at the properties of the machine. Here are some obvious properties of 
the output:7
(1) Responses are to actions or intentions, not to behaviors (unlike, 
e.g., the defensive reaction of a snake to someone who passes too close 
by). That is, the interpretation of others' behavior is a precondition for 
interaction. Interpretation involves mapping intentions or goals onto 
behavior, to yield component actions, bundles of behavior and mental 
instigations (a cough can be just a cough—a reflex—or an intended 
signal). This parsing of the other's behavior stream clearly presupposes 
some kind of simulation of the other's mental world.
(2) In interaction, a simulation of the other's simulation of oneself 
is also involved. This is shown most clearly by the fact that actions are 
generated taking into account that they will be interpreted by a specific 
other—that is, they exhibit recipient design. So I call my neighbor "Dick" 
only if I think you will recognize who I mean under that appellation 
(see Clark et al. 1983; Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs 1986; Schegloff 1972a, 
1995). This implies that the interpretation, based as in (1) on actions 
or intentions, can make use of a further principle: The action to be 
interpreted can be presumed to have been designed to be transparent to 
this particular recipient.
(3) Although human interaction is dominated by the use of language, 
language does not actually code the crucial actions being performed— 
these are nearly always inferred, or indirectly conveyed (Levinson 
1983:289-94, 2000; Sperber and Wilson 1995). In addition, "nonce 
signals" are easily devised, and in the case of "home sign" can even 
constitute the basis for an individual's main communication system. 
This implies that the fundamental signaling mechanism is independent 
of language—language just enormously amplifies its potential.
(4) Interaction is by and large cooperative. This is not a Panglossian 
claim that we all get on with one another. It is, rather, the claim that 
there is some level, not necessarily at the level of ulterior motivation, 
at which interactants intend their actions (a) to be interpretable (the 
underlying intentions to be recoverable), and (b) to contribute to some 
larger joint undertaking (having a conversation, making a hut, even 
having a quarrel!).
(5) Interaction is characterized by action chains and sequences 
(Schegloff in press, this volume) governed not by rule but by expectation. 
Thus, there is an assumption that a question expects an answer, but 
there is no rule that a question must be followed by an answer: "When 
are you going?" -> "Where?" is as well-formed a sequence as "When are
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you going?" -> "Ten o'clock."8 The outcome of a momentary interaction 
is something none of the parties can plan in advance—it is a contingent 
product. That is why there is no such thing as a formal grammar of 
discourse.
(6) Interaction is characterized by the reciprocity of roles (e.g., 
speaker-addressee, giver-taker), and typically by an alternation of roles 
over time, yielding a turn-taking structure (Sacks et al. 1974).
(7) Interaction takes place within a (constantly modulating) 
participation structure (specifying who is participating, and in what 
role), which in turn presumes ratified mutual access (Goffman 1979; 
Goodwin 1981). We can be copresent on a bus, but not be in such a 
state of incipient interaction—often rights of mutual access have to be 
negotiated (e.g., by greetings—see Duranti 1997).
(8) Interaction is characterized by expectation of close timing—an 
action produced in an interactive context (say a hand wave) sets up an 
expectation for an immediate response.
(9) Face-to-face interaction is characterized by multimodal signal 
streams—visual, auditory, and haptic at the receiving end, and kinesic, 
vocal, and motor at the producing end. These streams present a "binding 
problem"—requiring linking of elements which belong to one another 
across time and modality (e.g., a gesture may illustrate words that come 
later, a hand grasp may go with the following greeting).
(10) Interaction appears to have detailed universal properties, even 
j f  little cross-cultural work has actually been done to establish this. 
What we do know is that for a wide range of features, from turn taking, 
adjacency pairs (as in question-answer sequences), greetings, and repairs 
of interactional hitches and misunderstandings, the languages and 
cultural systems that have been studied reflect very similar, in some 
cases eerily similar, subsystems.
This list may seem too self-evident and bland to yield any far-reaching 
conclusions. But there is a lot more to say under each rubric. Let us 
consider (4), the cooperative nature of most human interaction (at 
least in the limited sense indicated), in a bit more detail, because of the 
crucial, and puzzling, role it plays in evolutionary theory (it is just very 
hard to see how cooperation could ever evolve under natural selection: 
see Hammerstein 1996; Boyd and Richerson this volume). There seem 
to be detailed properties of interaction that reflect cooperation, and that 
contrast with the properties of agonistic interaction. For example, the 
kind of intended transparency noted in (2) above derives ultimately 
from (4) cooperation: in antagonistic interaction (as in predator-prey
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relations), intentions should be hidden, as opaque as possible (even 
copresence should be disguised, of course!).
Or consider this: cooperation seems to make possible the specific 
properties of (5), action chains. In antagonistic interaction, as when 
tiger chases antelope, we can see interaction chains of the kind: antelope 
veers right, tiger veers right, antelope wheels left, tiger wheels left, and 
so forth
<1> A1 -> B1 -> A2 -> B2
that is, long chains of immediate responses. What we do not seem 
to find is anything like the embedded structures typical of human 
interaction:
<2> Al B2 -> A2 B1
An example would be the following, in which B's response to A's first 
action is deferred until clarification has been achieved:
<3> A: "I'd like some Marlboros" --------
B: "10 or 20?" I
A: "20 please" *+— ‘
B: (passes them) "That'll be 40 p." -------
The temporary shelving of one interactional task to solve another that 
is a precondition to it seems to presuppose cooperation. The embedded 
structure in <2> has formal properties that are quite different from 
the response chain in <1>: The simple response chain in <1> can be 
generated by a Markov process, whereas <2> requires something with 
a push-down stack like a Phrase-Structure Grammar.9 When it comes 
to parsing or comprehending a behavior sequence of the kind in <2> 
as opposed to that in <1>, quite different procedures have to come into 
play—now a response can be to an action way back in the behavior 
stream. If this generalizes, then we have a formal test for cooperative 
structures of interaction—they have long-distance dependencies of this 
type.
Consider another empirical finding with a bearing on the underlying 
cooperation in interaction. Conversation analysts have established 
that after a question, a request, offer, or the like, where a response is
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immediately relevant, the response options are not equal but ranked. 
Responses that are in the expected direction are immediate and brief, 
responses that are in the opposite direction are typically delayed, 
marked with hesitations and particles like well, and accompanied by 
explanations. Thus, the absence of an immediate response after the 
following indirect request apparently indicates quite clearly to the 
requester that his request will be declined:
<4> C: "So I was wondering would you be in your office on
Monday (.) by any chance
(2 second silence) Probably not." [Levinson 1983:320]
Many details of this kind of asymmetry between what are called "preferred 
responses" and "dispreferred responses" show that the organization 
of conversation biases actions in the preferred direction—the system 
is set up so that it is just easier to comply with requests or accept 
invitations than to decline them! In short, the system is biased toward 
cooperation.10
Ingredients for an "Interaction  Engine"
So far, we have seen that an interaction engine has to predict at least 
those features of interaction listed above. Now we can ask: what kind 
of a "machine" could produce those properties, that is, what does the 
human interactant have to be endowed with to generate such behavior? 
Let's key the points to our numbered properties above:
(1') To get property (1)—responses are to intentions not behaviors— 
we need a "Theory of Mind" (ToM). That is, any being capable of 
attributing goals and intentions to other actors must attribute a mind 
to the other actor (hence have a folk theory of mind, or ToM, in the 
broad sense explored by Astington this volume). ToM has typically 
been operationalized as relativized belief attribution, for example as 
attributing to Sam the false belief thatp (Leslie 2000). But here instead 
the heart of the matter is intention attribution: given the observed 
behavior, the interaction engine must be able to infer likely goals 
that would have motivated the behavior.11 Elsewhere, I have pointed 
out that this is a highly intractable computational problem, because 
it amounts to inferring premises from conclusions, which cannot be 
done by any logical engine (Levinson 1995:230ff.). It could perhaps 
be done on statistical grounds, using some low-level semiautomatic 
simulation as in the theory of "mirror neurons."12 That might account
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for a simple class of interpretable actions, like you raising your fork to 
your mouth. But it would never account for the meaningful cough, G ^ r 
or the ironic bow—actions whose interpretations are not in line with 
the statistical associations. The solution to those must lie in having 
powerful heuristics. But what exactly? This is where point (2) comes 
in, the ability not only to simulate the other's point of view but also 
to imagine what he or she thinks your point of view is.
(2') The simulation of the other's simulation of oneself may seem 
something more likely to occur in deception than in cooperation.13 
But it is crucial to cooperative interaction. It was Schelling (1960) who 
demonstrated the empirical power of this heuristic to solve coordination 
problems implicitly: for example, offer two separated subjects $1,000 
if they can both think of the same number without communicating— 
they can beat the odds (they are likely to assume each will find 1,000 
the salient solution). Or ask them to each go to where they think the 
other will go in a crowded department store (they may fixate on the 
"lost and found"). Exactly how it works has been much discussed, but 
clearly it involves a special kind o f  reflexive thinking: thinking what you 
would be thinking I would be thinking when I did the action. This 
coordination ability presupposes the notion of mutual knowledge (or 
common ground)—the things that I know you know, you know I know, 
and I know you know I know. But it also involves a notion of mutual 
salience—what leaps out of the common ground as a solution likely to 
independently catch our joint attention (the number 1,000 or the lost 
and found). This is what is involved in recipient design, the choice of just 
that phrase that will allow you to find the unique thing I am referring 
to, when it could be referred to in 1,000 myriad ways, none of them 
uniquely referring (Clark et al. 1983). A nice example of this is the use 
of phrases like "The what do you call it," which seem typically used 
where the speaker estimates the addressee can guess what the speaker 
has in mind (Enfield 2003). These are mental coordinations, meetings 
of the mind, in what I shall call the "Schelling mirror world."
(3') Our property (3) was a fundamental underlying signaling system 
independent of language or conventional code. This is provided 
by Grice's (1957) theory of meaning, which holds that a signaler S 
communicates z by behavior B if S intends to cause a recipient R to 
v- think z, just by getting R to recognize that intention. In other words, 
a communicative intention is one that achieves its goal as soon as it 
is recognized (the action B has no other instrumental efficacy). One 
way of thinking about this is: S tosses behavior B into the Schelling- 
mirror world, implying "I bet you can figure out why I did this, just
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by knowing that I know you can."14 Grice's theory gives us an account 
both of how we can communicate without conventional signals at all 
(as in First Contact or when I met Kpemuwo, the deaf man without a 
language), and of how we can communicate something distinct from 
what the conventional signals actually mean (as in irony, metaphor, 
hints, etc.).
This is how we can understand the meaningful cough, or the ironical 
bow, in which statistical inference will only allow the attribution of 
the reflexive cough and the genuine bow. And that is why intention 
attribution in interaction is altogether a different thing than intention 
attribution outside interaction. This is the difference between meaning 
attribution in the Gricean sense and mere action interpretation by 
an observer. Compare: I appear to smooth down my hair—I could be 
making the action to smooth down my hair, or I could be signaling "Your 
hair is standing up." The same behavior has distinct interpretations 
in (third-person) action-interpretation simpliciter, and interaction 
interpretation.
(4') Cooperative interaction—our property (4)—differs from antagon­
istic interaction in precisely the same way: antagonistic interaction only 
requires mere intention attribution (you'd better believe that however 
quietly the tiger sneaks up on you, he's out to eat you!),15 cooperative 
interaction requires the much more heady reflexive thinking: if we are 
going to carry out a joint action, say building something together, each 
contributive action has to be so designed that the other can see, just 
by how it is done, that it is intended to achieve the contributing role 
it is meant to play (Clark 1996:191ff.).16 That is another reason, in case 
there were not enough, why cooperative social systems occupy a remote 
corner of evolutionarily possible design space (Dennett 1995)—you 
have to have minds capable of simulating other minds simulating your 
own.
(5') What accounts for the fact (our property 5) that interaction is
(a) composed of action sequences, and (b) governed not by rules but 
only by expectations? In principle, actions in interaction could be 
simultaneous, if complementary, as in duets (see Clark 1996). But they 
are typically chained, one after the other. It might be thought that, 
for communication anyway, simultaneous broadcast would mask the 
message, but that does not deter the cicadas, and it does not explain 
the human case either, because we can listen and speak at the same 
time, as in simultaneous translation. No, there must be a reason for the 
alternation. One fundamental motivation is that, given that what I say 
has been designed for you to be able to see what I mean, it would be
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a good idea to see whether my design was actually as good as I hoped 
it was, which your response will make clear (Sacks et al. 1974). At the 
birth of cognitive science, Miller et al. (1960) suggested that the Test- 
Operate-Test-Exit (TOTE) unit should replace stimulus-response as the 
basic theoretical unit of human behavior: we test to see if the intended 
goal was achieved, if not, operate on it and try again. In cooperative 
interaction^ the only way to test is to see what the other person made 
of our actions. This is part of the motivation for taking turns, and it 
motivates too the priority accorded in interaction to correction and 
repair sequences—that is why "When are you going?" -> "Where?" is 
"well formed," or more properly, interpretable.
Linguists and anthropologists had hoped that there might be rules 
of conversational sequences, like rules of grammar, but the search was 
fundamentally misguided (Levinson 1983:286-94).17 There are indeed 
templates that specify sequences of actions, but these do not have the 
status of sequential rules (a few rituals excepted). The initial actions in 
these templates introduce a mental scenario as it were—consider "Are 
you doing anything tonight?" which introduces the frame Preinvitation 
-> Go ahead -> Invitation -> Acceptance as in:18
A: "Are you doing anything tonight?"
B: "No, why?"
A: "I was wondering if you'd like to catch a movie."
B: "Sure, what's on?"
The whole sequence can gracefully abort at the second turn, without 
the invitation ever surfacing—a sequential template is a mental entity, 
around which actions will be directed and interpreted, however the 
actual sequence transpires.
Which brings us back to Schelling, who pointed out that we can tacitly 
coordinate by each thinking what the other would think (so, e.g., when 
inadvertently separated in a department store, we both go to the last 
place we saw each other). Sequential templates hang in this mirror world 
of simulated mental spaces, and the ability to traverse those spaces was 
the theme of (2'). In sum, TOTE gives us sequences, and the Schelling 
mirror world gives us guiding expectations instead of rules.
(6') The sequential taking of turns (our property 6) may be partially 
motivated by TOTE, but turn taking itself does not necessarily imply 
alternation of roles in a single joint activity (compare taking turns at the 
gas pump). But some forms of cooperation at least require sharing bites 
of the same cherry. Sharing a resource is an elemental symbol of sociality,
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as in commensality. Informal human interaction is characterized by 
a conversational mode of exchange, in which the erstwhile speaker 
becomes a listener, and the erstwhile listener becomes a speaker, the 
valued commodity apparently being speaking while attentive others 
hold their tongues. This alternation of roles seems to be universally 
built into the deictic system of languages ("I" refers to the current 
speaker, "you" to the current addressee, and my "I" becomes your 
"you"). Many human societies have asymmetrical assignments of roles 
and elaborate divisions of labor, but in all of them informal interaction 
seems to be built on the alternation of conversational roles. Given 
that human language processing is obligate and automatic (hearing 
you speak English, I automatically comprehend even if I would rather 
not), the alternation of listening roles implies an obligatory inhabiting 
of others' mental worlds. So it seems that cooperative sharing of the 
communicational resource guarantees our mutual sharing of the 
Schelling mirror world.
(7') Interaction is organized around a participation structure (our 
property 7). Part of this is a byproduct of turn taking: in a two-party 
conversation, the alternation of speaker-addressee roles may exhaust 
the roles involved. But clearly this is not so when we have three or more 
participants, then we can have speaker, addressee, and nonaddressed 
participant. And in addition to passive participants there can be 
bystanders, nonparticipants with access to the interaction. Much finer 
discriminations of roles are also possible (Goffman 1979; Goodwin 1981; 
Levinson 1988). Interaction always presupposes a participation structure, 
which itself presupposes a distinction between being copresent but not 
in interaction versus copresent and participating. This distinction is 
precisely what motivates "access rituals" like greetings (Durant! 1997). 
And this distinction maps once again onto our two kinds of action- 
interpretation: (a) nonparticipants are engaged in action-interpretation 
simpliciter, without directly being able to benefit from recipient design,
(b) full participants can presuppose that each inhabits the shared Schelling 
mirror world, allowing each to assume that the other has constructed 
his or her actions to be interpretable to the intended participants. Thus, 
participation structure seems to be a property of human interaction 
that emerges from a number of other properties—turn taking and the 
mental simulations behind recipient design amongst them.
(8') The close-timing characteristics of human interaction (property 
8) may be partially attributed to some independent ethological source, 
some kind of mental metabolism as it were.19 But they partly follow 
from the design-and-test characteristic mentioned in (5'): a response
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that indicates how the prior action was understood, needs to be adjacent 
to that action—and given the free turn competition, the only way to 
ensure that, is to be immediately next (otherwise another participant 
may take the next turn, or the prior speaker resume speaking). Hence, 
the timing properties of human interaction can be partly attributed to 
the turn-taking properties discussed in (5') and (6').
(9') Humans are not unique in using multimodal signal streams in 
interaction (our property 9): many animal displays have these character­
istics, and since Darwin (1872) there have been many attempts to 
understand the evolutionary and ethological background. Simultaneous 
display of bared teeth, flared nostrils, and a growl can serve to signal 
aggression. But in the human case, at least, the whole display is not 
just a gestalt: the multimodal behavior streams have to interlock at 
many minute borders and boundaries. There is no doubt that the digital 
nature of language is partly responsible for this microstructuring of 
the signal stream. Yet careful inspection of video records shows that 
synchrony alone will not do the trick of hooking up the bits in the 
different signal streams: gestures, facial expressions, nods, and the like 
can come earlier or later than the words they go with. There seems 
to be a significant "binding problem" in hooking up the signals that 
go together. If temporal binding is not sufficient, what will do the 
trick? Suppose I bow low to the Dean and then wink at you—to see 
if and how the two signals link requires an analysis of what might 
have driven each behavior, and how those two intentions might be 
put together. It is, if one likes, a problem in meaning composition, or 
goal analysis—the mental reconstruction of communicative intentions 
expressed through clues which are designed to be just sufficient. Human 
multimodal communication is as much artifice as ethology, and the 
capacities that drive it will crucially include the mental simulation of 
the other (2' above) and the reconstruction of motives or intentions 
(3' above).
(10') What could be responsible for the apparent universals of 
interaction, like the turn-taking and repair systems of casual conversa­
tion? At least some of the properties seem to follow from, or be 
motivated by, features we have already considered—thus, turn taking 
may partly derive from the cooperative sharing of a common resource, 
and the need to test interpretations that are in a way only guesses 
in a Schelling mirror world. But it seems likely that many aspects of 
human interaction (turn taking among them) have a long phylogenetic 
history. Face and voice recognition, known to implicate specialized 
circuitry in the brain, are preconditions to any social interaction, in the
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sense of interaction tailored to specific social persons. Language is also 
biologically underpinned in many complex ways. The simultaneous 
activation of gesture, gaze, posture, and paralanguage—the particular 
channels of human multimodal interaction—all contribute to the 
distinctive ensemble of interactional signals typical of human ethology, 
picked up as the flotsam of evolution.20
Let me summarize. A review of properties of human social interaction 
suggests that the core interaction engine consists of a bunch of ingredi­
ents, but crucially:
■ Attribution o f  intention, or "mind-reading" in a broad sense, is a 
crucial precondition (call it level 1), but is itself nowhere near 
the abilities needed to generate human interaction. Here, some 
automatic link from action-perception to the action-production 
system, as with mirror neurons, together with statistical induction 
(as Byrne this volume implies) may be enough to map behaviors 
onto intentions or goals.
■ A crucial additional level is the ability to enter Schelling mirror 
worlds, to do the mental computations that allow us to simulate 
the other simulating us. Here, we have the ingredient of mutual 
salience for us right now (reliant on common ground). This allows 
mental coordination without communication. Now we can beat the 
statistical odds hands down. The distinction between level 1 above 
and this second level correlates with antagonistic versus cooperative 
interaction: level 2 is not necessary for antagonistic interaction 
(although it may be ruthlessly exploited in it), but it is necessary 
for cooperative interaction. ,
■ A third crucial level is having Gricean intentions, intentions that 
drive behaviors whose sole function is to have an effect by virtue 
of having their intentions recognized. It is this level 3 that makes 
high-level communication possible, and on its foundation language 
has evolved, and still relies on nearly every occasion of use.
■ Woven in and out of this is the cooperative nature of human 
interaction—there would not be any point of getting into Schelling 
mirror worlds unless cooperation was a reasonable presumption 
(once there, sure, Machiavellian exploitation of the system will be 
a thing to guard against).
■ There is a set of empirically observable practices—turn taking, 
sequence templates and repair among them—which look universal 
and are only partly derivable from other features. These form part 
of a raft of ethological proclivities which help to account for the 
species-specific character of human multimodal communication.
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Note that this analysis, if correct, has some utility for the comparative 
study of interaction in phylogeny and ontogeny, for it predicts an 
ordered series of steps toward human interaction, from level 1-3, while 
noting that ethological patterns like turn taking may develop earlier 
and independently.
Culture and the "Interaction  Engine"
Many sociocultural anthropologists may react with hostility to the ideas 
so far discussed—the direction of argument may seem to belittle the 
role of the cultural construction of social life, like so many ideas in 
sociobiology, human ethology, or evolutionary psychology. But that 
would be the wrong reaction. We are trying to probe what underlies 
that cultural construction, what makes cultures get off the ground so to 
speak—what makes them learnable, and what provides the framework 
within which the cultural can do its work. The positive reward for 
speculating about common human potentialities is that we may 
understand much better what generates the diversity itself.
Cultural Variation
Interaction is shot through and through with culture. It had better be, 
because it is the vehicle of culture—without it, there would not be any. 
Even though culture conditions and shapes private acts—the way we 
urinate or defecate, for example, or even the way we walk—it is through 
public, and especially interactive, acts that culture propagates itself. 
And every anthropologist, indeed every traveler, has been impressed 
with differences in interactional mores. Just to mention a few of my 
own observations, consider:
(1) In rural Tamilnadu, in a typical village of 18 castes, who can 
interact with whom, and in what ways, is elaborately specified in a 
mental 17 x 17 matrix (Levinson 1982). One indelible memory is of a 
high-caste foreman arriving on bicycle at a building site, engendering 
the total cessation of works as all the low-caste workers scramble down 
the scaffolding so that they can receive instructions while not having 
their heads higher than their caste better.
(2) In Cape York, the aboriginal speakers of Guugu Yimithirr incorporate 
gestures into their verbal interaction in a much more fundamental way 
than Europeans do. For example, a negative gesture preceding a positive 
assertion signals a negative proposition, or the subject and object of 
a verb may be omitted but indicated by gesture. The great majority
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of gestures are intended to have directional veracity—no mere hand 
waving here (see Levinson 2003).
(3) In Chiapas, Mexico, Tzeltal-speakingTenejapans are peasants who 
maintain a decorum appropriate to a royal court: Long and elaborate 
greeting sequences specify whether the intruder is merely passing by 
(and if so in the same or different direction as the intruded, or past the 
intruded's home base) or arriving to visit (Stross 1967). Once begun, 
interaction is properly conducted sitting side by side with the minimum 
of mutual gaze, each assertion being partially repeated by the recipient, 
with long sequences of the kind: "I've come to visit you" -> "You've 
come to visit perhaps" -> "I have come" -> "You have indeed" -> "Indeed 
I have." ... (Brown 1998; Levinson and Brown 2005).
(4) On Rossel Island, Papua New Guinea, interaction is typically 
dyadic, squatting eyeball to eyeball, with sustained mutual gaze, and 
incorporating many facial displays, and eye-pointings. Fast, informal, 
with much mutual touching, two big bankers of shell-money can 
conduct important business for the whole island with a nod and a 
wink, making a striking contrast to the apparent Tenejapan formality 
of interaction over matters much more trivial (Levinson and Brown 
2005).
These observations, and a thousand like them, raise the question: 
What sense does it make to talk about a core interaction engine as if 
it was a universal property of mankind, given all this rich texture of 
cultural diversity?
The answer is that the interaction engine is not to be understood 
as an invariant, a fixed machine with a fixed output, but as a set of 
principles that can interdigitate iwith local principles, to generate 
different local flavors. Let me outline just one example of the kind of 
interplay between the universal and the culturally particular I have 
in mind (the details appear in Levinson 2005). Sacks and Schegloff 
(1979) suggested that two principles govern the reference to persons 
in English conversation: a preference for using a minimal form (e.g., 
a name), and a preference for using a form (a "recognitional") under 
which the referent can be recognized by the recipient. Usually these two 
preferences can be satisfied simultaneously. But sometimes they come 
apart. For example, if the speaker is unsure whether the recipient will 
recognize the referent under a single name, he may try it out, marking 
the "try" with rising intonation—if there is no uptake, a second name 
may then be introduced, also with a "try" intonation, then a description, 
and so on. So we get a sequence like this:
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<5> A: ... well I was the only one other than the uhm tch Fords?. <r (1)
Uh Mrs Holmes Ford? f  (2)
You know uh the the cellist? <- (3) 
[
B: Oh yes. She's she's the cellist <- (4)
A: Yes well she and.............
[Sacks and Schegloff 1979:19]
At (1) the speaker tries a single name, upgrading at (2) with a second 
name and a title, and at (3) with a description, whereupon getting 
acknowledgement of recognition at (4), the speaker proceeds. What the 
sequence displays is that recognition takes priority, the minimization 
being successively relaxed till recognition is achieved (common ground 
established). It shows that a minimal clue to a Schelling solution is 
tried first.
Very similar sequences can be found in other quite unrelated languages 
I have worked on, including Guugu Yimithirr, Tzeltal, and Yell Dnye 
(the language of Rossel Island). One has to allow for the fact that 
upgradings might take different forms (e.g., identifying conventions 
might employ place of origin specifications), and even that different 
modalities might be involved (e.g., pointings, eye glances at places of 
origin)—but allowances made, the sequences are eerily familiar. Here 
is one from Guugu Yimithirr:
<6> B: ngayu nubuun nhaaway waami dyibaalu warra Milga-mul? <-1  
Is one there found to.South old ears-without 
"I came across one fellow there to the South, old 'without ears'?" 
<points>
(0.3) <- 2
R: aa < -3
"Oh"
(0.4) 4
B: oo Tommy Confen? <- 5
"old Tommy Confen?"
R: ee ^ -6
"ah"
B: nyulu nhamuun bamaal nganhi wangaarmun nhaathi durrginbigu 
gaadariyga bada
"That fellow saw me, as I was coming down Indian Head"
[Revgest 00:17:01]
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At line 1, B tries Tommy Confen's nickname, namely "Without Ears" 
(he was deaf), with intonational rise on "Ears." Now critically, he has 
supplemented this reference with an earlier quick pointing gesture to 
where the Confen household used to be, coinciding with the underlined 
word -nubuun—but unfortunately R was not looking (see Fig. 1.2 [a]). 
B therefore has reason to doubt that R has got the reference: he gazes 
straight at R throughout this sequence until point 5, to assess whether 
recognition has occurred (see Fig. 1.2 [b]). R's response at point 3 is 
slightly delayed, and has a form (indicating "news") suggesting that 
it could be a response to the earlier part of what B said. B therefore 
tries again at 5 with rising intonation, with both English names of the 
referent. R responds positively, with mutual gaze, and B then turns 
away and resumes the story.
That suggests that cross-culturally there seem to be the same two 
preferences, they seem to have the same ranking, and when they cannot 
be satisfied simultaneously, minimization is successively relaxed. Let 
us take this, on the basis of parallels in four unrelated cultures, as a 
candidate universal, acknowledging that we would need a lot of further 
evidence to firm this up.
On Rossel Island, there is an additional wrinkle, a cultural taboo on 
naming that interacts with these preferences. The taboo specifies that 
one may not name close in-laws or relatives recently deceased. How does 
this then interact with the candidate universal preferences? Let us take a 
look. In the following excerpt, J out of the blue refers to someone as "that 
(distant) girl," pointing <7> south up over the mountain (utterance [1]).
i
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Figure 1.2. Guugu Yimithirr person reference sequence: (a) frame showing 
unobserved quick point to referent's home base; (b) frame showing mutual gaze 
at point at which recognition is achieved.
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Figure 1.3. Rossel Island name-avoidance sequence: (a) points up on "that 
thing"; (b) points over mountain on "that girl"; (c) points W on second "that 
girl"; (d) ditto on "you see/' widening eyes; (e) recipient gives eyebrow flash; (f) 
recipient says "ah" in overlap.
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The utterance is "try-marked" with rising intonation, and the gesture is 
held while looking at R (Fig. 1.3[a], [b]). R does not respond in the gap
(2). J upgrades the description in (3), not by adding a verbal description 
or name but by pointing West while widening his eyes and gazing at 
R (Fig. 1.3[c], [d]). At this point R responds with an eyebrow flash (a 
local "yes, continue" marker), followed by a verbal acknowledgment, 
and recognition achieved, J continues.
<7> J: mu kopu mwo a pyaa wo, mu dmaadi nge? 
that affair over.there happened that girl topic
<—points South over mountain----------- holds point, looking at
"That thing (pointing) that happened a while ago, that girl?"
(·)
mu dmaadi nge? cha w:ee? 
that girl topic you understand 
<—opens eyes wide, points West>
"that girl, you see?"
[
R: (eye-brow flash) ee
"right, yes"
J: yi dmaadi pi kuu, yed:oo nipi nmi dmaadi cha w:ee 
"that girl is our affair, she's one of ours"
[Rossel Island R02_V4 00:03:27]
The odd thing about the episode is the reference at (1) to a new referent 
with such a general description ("that girl") with the presumption 
nevertheless that the referent is recognizable. In holding his gesture, 
waiting, repeating the description with a new gesture, J is clearly 
persisting in seeking recognition. Nevertheless, he systematically avoids 
a name, instead using the same general description but providing two 
distinct gestural clues, first over the mountain to his own village where 
the girl was raised, and then West where she has just died (see Fig. 
1.3). The recent death (itself only alluded to by "that thing") requires 
the name avoidance. Thus, R is faced with a Schelling problem: a very 
general description ("that girl") supplemented with gestural clues, and 
with the background knowledge that one reason for not naming a person 
is their recent death. The clues evidently prove sufficient, as R claims to 
have recognized the referent at (4).
Notice how the culturally specific rule (a name taboo) folds into 
our candidate universal preferences. The speaker goes for recognition. 
He is blocked from using a name, but uses a brief general description, 
satisfying minimization, with a gestural clue. When this is not sufficient,
<r(l)
R>
<-(2)
*-(3)
<-(4)
<-(5)
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he is again blocked from using a name, and tries an upgrade using a 
second gestural clue, while claiming with wide eyes (see Fig. 1.3 [d]) 
and intonation that the addressee can locate the referent in Schelling 
space. All three preferences are interlocked: do not name, yet go for 
recognition, while seeking minimal reference. Further cases of name 
taboo on Rossel show similar patterns: nonverbal upgrades are preferred 
to verbal ones, as they better satisfy the ban on speaking of the taboo 
person. Space precludes extensive discussion of this theme, but the 
point is that the culturally specific does not necessarily eclipse the 
(candidate) universal procedures—they are woven together to make a 
coherent local practice.
The identification and naming of persons is, if anything is, a cul­
tural matter, and yet it seems to mesh seamlessly with the universal 
systematics of interaction. The hypothesis is that the interaction engine 
will be most recognizable in informal, everyday conversation, which 
forms the normal matrix for language acquisition and socialization. 
The ethnography of speaking has long established that when we look 
at special, ritual or institutional speech events, we find ourselves in the 
culture-specific territory of séances, ceremonies, investitures, political 
oratory, and the like (Bauman and Sherzer 19 74; Duranti 2001). Even here, 
though, the interesting suggestion emerging from work in conversation 
analysis is that specialized speech events are built by tweaking the rules 
and principles governing informal conversation. Thus, the differences 
between a press conference and a classroom can be partly captured by 
considering both the similarities (multiple persons, but only two parties, 
one singular—teacher or press officer) and the differences (questioning 
assigned to the party with the multiple persons, as in press conferences, 
or to the singular party, as in classrooms; see Schegloff 1987).
This idea—that the local, cultural specialization is a variation off a 
universal theme—is potentially powerful, because as we learn more about 
conversational organization we see that there are relatively few, crucial 
organizing principles. For example, ringing the changes on different 
possible systems of turn taking, participation-structure, and action 
sequences will give us many key aspects of culture-specific speech events. 
We also see that at a finer level of structure, the modulation of the way in 
which actions are expressed (e.g., directly vs. indirectly, with or against 
preference organization) conveys the qualities of social relations (Brown 
and Levinson 1987). Conversation analysts have therefore sometimes 
taken a "constructionist" view of social organization (see again Schegloff 
1987): you are, as it were, what you say. This does not always accord 
with the anthropological experience (Levinson 2005): it may work in
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New Guinea, but in India you are what you are born. However, viewed 
as a system of principles that predicts, for each possible manipulation 
of the systematics, what the consequences will be, it promises to be a 
powerful tool for understanding cross-cultural variation.
The idea, then, is not that the interaction engine produces cross- 
cultural uniformity but, rather, that it provides the building blocks for 
cultural diversity in social interaction. Or in a less crude analogy, it 
provides the parameters for variation, with default values that account 
for the surprising commonalities in the patterns of informal interchange 
across cultures.
One reason that sociocultural anthropologists should be interested in 
grasping the nature of these parameters is that interactional principles 
clearly play a central role in higher level social processes. This is entirely 
transparent in tribal societies, where since Sir Henry Maine (1861) it 
has been appreciated that larger entities like descent groups act like 
individuals, contracting marriages and alliances or conducting feuds. 
Less obviously, politics and diplomacy among modern nation states 
has much the same character, of a conversation conducted according 
to the principles of interaction, albeit between representatives of huge 
agglomerates. We attribute intentions to political maneuvers as if states 
were individuals, instead of the rambling conglomerates with different 
factional interests that they really are (Levinson 1995:225).
In short, the analysis of interaction could and should play a major 
role in our analysis of social institutions and international politics. 
Humans come natively equipped for interacting with conspecifics. We 
use this interpretive apparatus for understanding large scale polities of a 
kind that we have only recently innovated in our evolutionary history, 
and for which they may be inappropriate. For, however inappropriate, 
whatever other natural model would we have?
Conclusion
My thesis has been that the notion of a core interaction engine driving 
human social life makes eminently good sense. There is good prima 
facie evidence for it, and work in psychology, linguistics, anthropology, 
sociology and philosophy all point toward it. It is not easy to isolate the 
critical features of such an ability, because they range from the abstract 
mental simulations of Schelling mirror worlds, to the concrete problems 
of binding across multimodal signals, or the processes generating striking 
cross-cultural parallels across procedures for person reference. But the 
effort has to be worth it. Progress promises the key to understanding
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human evolution, and it offers to shed light on human ontogeny, 
higher level social processes, and the limitations of a mentality forged 
in face-to-face contact in the present world of nation states, superhuman 
agglomerations endowed by us with personal attributes they mostly do 
not have. It is an effort in which anthropology should have a central 
role to play.
Notes
1. This chapter takes off from the position paper authored by Nick 
Enfield and myself, and precirculated in June 2004. Thanks are owed to the 
participants to the Wenner-Gren symposium in which these ideas were first 
aired and discussed. I am also grateful for help from Penelope Brown.
2. See Connolly and Anderson 1987. It could have been a chance match 
of cultural mores, the raw greed of colonial mercantilism happening to meet 
its match in Melanesian exchange—see Strathern 1992.
3. Dunbar's point is that human verbal interaction replaces primate 
grooming, and he is therefore especially interested to find that 60 percent of 
conversation concerns social relationships and person topics (1997:123).
4. Hymes (1972:40) mentions a number of cases in which the ethnographers 
have noticed the extreme taciturnity of the people—he cites Gardner for 
example on the Paliyans of South India, who "communicate very little at all 
times and become silent by the age of 40. Verbal, communicative persons are 
regarded as abnormal and often as offensive."
5. There are problems quantifying what counts as interaction. Are 
nonaddressed listeners interacting? Perhaps only if they are ratified participants 
(see Goffman 1979; Levinson 1988). Is talk essential? No, signs, winks, and 
nods will do—we are interested in mutual, interlocking sequences of actions 
(see below), which are not dependent on language. Is a mother rocking a baby 
"interacting" in the favored sense? Yes, if in response to baby's actions, but no 
if baby is asleep.
6. My neighbors got further than I did for a number of reasons. First, 
although Kpemuwo's village is some distance away, he is familiar to them. 
Second, they shared much more background knowledge of the situations 
being described. Third, their signing was more perspicuous to Kpemuwo than 
mine because it made use of conventional elements of the gesture system— 
the spoken language is accompanied by a rich set of conventional gestures or 
"emblems."
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7. This list, derived from the empirical literature, is not so far removed 
from the philosophical view derived by H. P. Grice, whose theory of "meaning" 
(1957) covers points (1) and (2), and whose "maxims of conversation" (1975) 
cover (3), (4) and (7—"relevance") at least.
8. Conversational analysts have introduced the technical term "conditional 
relevance" for this expectation (see, e.g., Schegloff 1972b).
9. On the hierarchy of grammars modeling behavior sequences see Partee 
et al. 1990:433ff.
10. More strictly, the system is asymmetrically structured in such a way 
that interactants can deploy it to try and extract cooperation (thanks to 
Tanya Stivers for helping me see this connection between preference and 
cooperation). See Levinson 1983:332ff. and Schegloff in press for exposition 
of "preference."
11. False belief tasks are not mastered by normal Western children until 
almost four years old, but by that age children are experienced interactants. 
Leslie 1994 suggests that action interpretation begins at around eight months 
without the notion of propositional attitudes essential to attributions of belief, 
which begins only at 24 months. Mastery of false belief requires, he argues, a 
further special kind of inhibition not available for another two years (Leslie 
2000:1242).
12. See Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) on the discovery that specialized neurons 
fire when the same action is both perceived and executed—suggesting a low- 
level solution to "reading" other minds. But this correlation is learned, as 
shown by recent experiments, so there still has to be a higher-level mechanism 
relating action and perception.
13. In ToM models, this is often called "second-order belief" (what A 
believes B believes about p : see Bafon-Cohen 2000). Here, though, we are 
actually interested in something that has some of the properties of potentially 
infinitely nested beliefs: what A believes B believes that A believes ... about 
p. Although that is not psychologically plausible, there are psychologically 
plausible heuristics that approximate it—see Clark 1996:92ff. for review.
14. Usually this has been thought about the other way around, with 
Schelling processes embedded in Gricean intentions, rather than the reverse 
as here suggested.
15. Antagonistic interaction can be Machiavellian, that is, designed to look 
cooperative but with hidden ulterior motives. In that case it is exploiting 
cooperative interaction—in a trivial sense, every cooperative interaction can 
be embedded in a Machiavellian one. The point here is reflexive thinking 
is not an essential feature of antagonistic interaction as it is of cooperative 
interaction. See following note on the definition of "interaction" here.
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16. Why, one might ask, is all this mentalism necessary? Symbiosis after all 
has two forms, mutualism and parasitism, and both forms, cooperative and 
antagonistic, can occur without minds. But here I am using "interaction" in a 
special sense, in terms of sequences of actions, where by definition an action 
is a pairing of a mental intention or goal and the behavior designed to achieve 
it.
17. There may be ritual sequences, like greetings and partings, that allow 
a rule-governed treatment, as in Irvine (1974), but these do not cover the 
central business transacted in between.
18. Fabricated data for reasons of compression—see Levinson (1983:345); 
and Schegloff in press.
19. Conversational analysts have noted (of English conversation) that 
pauses or gaps of between one-tenth to two-tenths of a second—roughly the 
duration of an unstressed syllable—can often be treated as significant failures 
to respond. Psycholinguists have tried to link the duration of the segment, the 
syllable, and the word to the temporal binding properties of the brain—a real 
temporal metabolism.
20. Earlier attempts to build a science of human ethology (Eibl-Eibesfeld 
1989; von Cranach et al. 1979) have largely petered out. Current evolutionary 
psychology seems headed quite elsewhere, away from the observation of 
natural human behavior.
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